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A B S T R A C T
Background
Tuberculosis (TB) is a major public health problem in developing countries. Following the
disruption to health services in East Timor due to violent political conflict in 1999, the National
Tuberculosis Control Program was established, with a local non-government organisation as
the lead agency. Within a few months, the TB program was operational in all districts.
Methods and Findings
Using the East Timor TB program as a case study, we have examined the enabling factors for
the implementation of this type of communicable disease control program in a post-conflict
setting. Stakeholder analysis was undertaken, and semi-structured interviews were conducted
in 2003 with 24 key local and international stakeholders. Coordination, cooperation, and
collaboration were identified as major contributors to the success of the TB program. The
existing local structure and experience of the local non-government organisation, the
commitment among local personnel and international advisors to establishing an effective
program, and the willingness of international advisers and local counterparts to be flexible in
their approach were also important factors. This success was achieved despite major
impediments, including mass population displacement, lack of infrastructure, and the
competing interests of organisations working in the health sector.
Conclusions
Five years after the conflict, the TB program continues to operate in all districts with high
notification rates, although the lack of a feeling of ownership by government health workers
remains a challenge. Lessons learned in East Timor may be applicable to other post-conflict
settings where TB is highly prevalent, andmay have relevance to other disease control programs.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Introduction
Tuberculosis (TB) infection and disease is intertwined with
poverty [1]. The overwhelming burden of TB, over 80% of the
4.4 million cases of TB notiﬁed to the World Health
Organization (WHO) in 2003, lies in developing countries
[2]. Almost 60% of the cases were notiﬁed from Asian or
Paciﬁc countries [2].
In 1993, WHO declared TB a global emergency and
formulated a ‘‘ﬁve-point plan’’ known as DOTS (for ‘‘directly
observed treatment, short-course’’) to ﬁght the disease. It
comprises political commitment, case detection using sputum
microscopy, standardized short-course chemotherapy under
proper case-management conditions including directly ob-
served treatment, a regular drug supply, and a standardized
recording and reporting system that allows assessment of
individual patients as well as overall program performance [3].
Huge strides have beenmade inDOTS implementation during
the past decade. There is a need for research to address the
applicability of the DOTS strategy in post-conﬂict settings
because of the often extraordinary circumstances present [1].
East Timor shares a border with Indonesia and lies 800 km
to the northwest of Australia. It is one of the poorest
countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc. The population of 925,000 are
predominantly subsistence farmers; their families live in rural
areas [4]. After 400 y as a colony of Portugal, East Timor was
annexed by Indonesia in 1975, and for the following 24 y it
was considered a province of Indonesia. In 1999, the country
was torn apart by political violence led by groups who
opposed the outcome of a referendum in favour of East
Timorese independence. Militia systematically ransacked,
looted, and destroyed up to 70% of infrastructure in almost
every town and village, with government buildings—includ-
ing health facilities—being major targets. The health-care
system collapsed. United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops
intervened and stabilised the country under UN adminis-
tration for 2 y, before East Timor gained independence in
May 2002 (Table 1).
The international humanitarian response to the complex
emergency in 1999 was swift: within a week of the interna-
tional sanction of a UN peace enforcement mission (Interna-
tional Force East Timor [INTERFET]) in September, several
UN agencies (including WHO) had arrived. Within a month,
around 100 international non-government organisations
(NGOs), many with health components to their work, were
present in the country. The lack of government structures,
the absence of many community leaders, the mass displace-
ment of the population, and a perceived reluctance on the
part of East Timorese leaders to make decisions in these
circumstances made dealing with the situation from a
development perspective difﬁcult [5]. In the emergency
phase, health services were mainly delivered by international
NGOs, with church-run clinics and some not-for-proﬁt
private practices providing important additional coverage.
In the transition to independence, NGO-run health services
were progressively handed over to the nascent Ministry for
Table 1. Timeline of Key Political and TB Control Developments in East Timor
Date Political Developments TB Control
Prior to 1974 Portuguese colonization
1975 to 1999 Indonesian occupation Indonesian NTP (1996–1999);
Caritas East Timor TB control program (1997–1999)
May 1999 Referendum announcement; UN Mission in
East Timor arrives to oversee democratic process
May to August 1999 Increasing militia activity disrupts health services
throughout East Timor
TB control also severely affected
30 August 1999 78.5% of East Timorese vote for independence
1–19 September 1999 Post-referendum period; anti-independence militia
destroy East Timor; mass refugee movements
20 September 1999 First INTERFET troops arrive
September 1999 to February 2000 Emergency period 26–28 October 1999: WHO TB assessment mission to
East Timor; 26 November 1999: first meeting of National Tuberculosis
Committee; 21 January 2000: NTP established and commences
operations in three districts
16 February 2000 Formation of the IHA under the UN Transitional
Authority in East Timor by eight international
and 16 Timorese health professionals
March 2000 to May 2002 Transition to independence October 2000: NTP operating in all 13 districts with NGOs as main
implementing partners in early period, then IHA in later period
20 May 2002 East Timor independence day By end of 2002: population coverage: 79%; 10,722 patients
treated (2000–2002); treatment success: 81%
IHA, Interim Health Authority (nascent Ministry of Health); NTP, National Tuberculosis Control Program.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030383.t001
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Health (the Interim Health Authority) under the UN
administration (Table 1).
TB had, for many years, been identiﬁed as a major public
health problem in East Timor. From 1996, two TB programs
operated in parallel: one run by the Indonesian Ministry of
Health and one run by an externally funded church-based
organisation (Caritas East Timor). Following the referendum
and associated violence, many health staff left East Timor or
were unable to continue working, and TB services were
severely disrupted [5]. The magnitude of the TB epidemic in
East Timor is believed to have increased in 1999 [6]. Within a
few months of the September events, people from many
different organisations contributed to the establishment of a
National Tuberculosis Control Program that conformed to
WHO’s DOTS strategy (Figure 1). In its ﬁrst 5 y, the TB
program diagnosed and commenced treatment for 17,210
patients [7]. In 2001, the notiﬁcation rate was 446 cases per
100,000 population for all forms of TB, and 154 per 100,000
population for new smear-positive pulmonary cases. These are
the highest rates in the Southeast Asian and Western Paciﬁc
Regions [2]. This reﬂects both the high burden of disease and
the effective case-ﬁnding system that has been developed and
sustained in East Timor since 1999. There has been gradual
progress in DOTS expansion, with the TB program function-
ing in all 13 districts and accessible to 79% of the population
of East Timor. Treatment results have improved, and the
treatment success rate is now consistently over 80% [7].
This paper aims to identify the key factors that enabled the
Figure 1. Structure of the National Tuberculosis Control Program in East Timor, 1999–2002
1Minister of Health includes earlier health leaders, including the co-chair of the Interim Health Authority of the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and later Head of the Division of Health Services in the East Timorese Transitional Authority (ETTA).
2MoH, Ministry of Health.
3NTP, National Tuberculosis Control Program.
4Caritas, Caritas East Timor, a Timorese church-based NGO.
5iNGO, international NGO.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030383.g001
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establishment of a successful TB program in East Timor,
while attempts to develop other sustainable programs in the
post-conﬂict period have struggled [5]. We document,
analyse, and reﬂect on this set of experiences and place them
in the public domain for critique and lesson-learning.
Methods
Themethods employed included the following: review of the
published literature on post-conﬂict health systems develop-
ment, review of documents and reports from the time period
1999–2003 relating to East Timor, interview of key informants
with knowledge of the TB program and its development over
this time period, and critical reﬂection on the experience of
two key stakeholders and authors (N. M. and P. M. K.).
All stakeholders and inﬂuential individuals currently and/
or previously involved in the setting up and administration of
the National Tuberculosis Control Program between 1999
and 2003 were identiﬁed and contacted with a request to
interview them. Of the 30 people identiﬁed, 24 were available
for interview.No stakeholder refused participation, and the six
who did not participate were either non-contactable or were
otherwise unavailable for interview. Stakeholders who were
not interviewed were represented in the interviewed group by
others who held closely related posts during the time period
under study. Those who participated in this study included
government ofﬁcials (the Minister of Health and other high-
ranking staff), local and international health professionals,
staff of local and international NGOs involved in health
services delivery, private practitioners, local politicians,
church leaders, current and previous TB program directors
and staff, the current and previous WHO representatives in
East Timor, donor representatives, and TB consultants.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted by the principal
author (NM), either face-to-face (n¼ 16) or via E-mail (n¼ 8).
Open-endedquestionswere employed in order to gain asmuch
qualitative information as possible about the participants’
views on the process of establishing the National Tuberculosis
Control Program. Participants were also asked to comment on
the effectiveness of the TB program, and the current and
future challenges it faces. The interviews were recorded in
handwritten notes, tape recordings and E-mail messages in
response to the interviewer’s written questions. After each
interview a summary transcript was prepared, and participants
were offered the opportunity to read and check these for
accuracy. Where required, follow-up interviews were under-
taken to clarify particular comments and issues. From these
interviews we were able to identify, through the perspectives of
these stakeholders, the factors that were perceived to contrib-
ute to the success of the East Timor TB program, and the
challenges it faces in the future. Three authors (NM, ABZ, and
JAG) contributed to the stakeholder analysis, drawing on the
methods described by Varvasovszky and Brugha [8]. Two of the
authors (ABZ and JAG) were not directly involved with the
events reported in this paper and acted as independent
external observers within the team (see Box 1).
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the
Human Research Ethics Committees of the Menzies School of
Box 1. Insider and Outsider Perspectives in Qualitative Research
An important feature of the work undertaken and presented
here was the involvement of two of the authors in the events
described in this paper. These insider–outsider perspectives are
contentious, but we believe add considerable strength to the
insights able to be derived through such work: they offer an
opportunity to tell the story of the TB program through the
words of both the authors and the range of informants
consulted, and they demand reference back to the real
constraints and opportunities operating in such environments.
They add to the reflections of others to develop a rich insight
into the perspectives of the stakeholders involved at the time,
and their voices, heard through this paper.
The boundary between researcher and researched frequently
blurs in qualitative studies [32]. The authors (N. M., the founding
director of the TB program, and P. M. K., an international TB
consultant) were key participants in the processes and events
described in this paper. Power relationships are always proble-
matic in research, in particular in qualitative research. We were
acutely aware of this during the planning phase, the research
itself, the analysis of the data, and the writing up of our findings.
The principal author (N. M.) was the key to access in this study,
and we feel that this unique access to such a wide variety of
opinions outweighs the potential bias that his previous position
may have bought to the study findings. It should be noted that
N. M. was not in a position of power when the interviews took
place (he had resigned as director of the TB program some 3 y
previously). In Timorese society, it is true that social hierarchy
can lead to those perceived as ‘‘inferiors’’ being reticent to
criticise their ‘‘superiors’’. However, peers and those in socially
superior positions are typically frank with their opinions, as
evidenced by the dissenting and critical statements included in
the article. This free exchange of views is also demonstrated by
the dissenting opinions obtained in interviews of foreign staff.
Thus, we are confident that we have addressed this important
issue, and acknowledged potential bias in our conclusions.
The positioning of two of the authors as ‘‘insiders’’,
particularly in combination with two ‘‘outsider’’ authors, adds
strength, but also has some limitations. The limitations include
whether too strong a voice is given to the particular perspectives
of two of the players, and whether their involvement in conduct
and analysis of interviews undermines objective assessment. The
involvement of the two authors not involved in the TB program
development offers an opportunity to engage with some of the
material through review of the interview data, and to test out
some of the ideas and the analysis.
As stated by Merriam and colleagues [33], ‘‘the insider’s
strengths become the outsider’s weaknesses and vice-versa’’,
and ‘‘this multiplicity of perspectives’’ enhances rather than
detracts from the validity of observations made. Developing an
insider–outsider team helps establish balance. What is presented
canperhapsbedescribedas theperspectives andcritical insights of
key players in the establishment of the TB programat a crucial time
in its history. The benefit is that unique insights are documented,
analysed, and presented for further critique and analysis: no
attempt is made here to state that the insights presented in this
paper are neutral or not coloured by the involvement of two key
players. Ratherwe argue that this history provides additional depth
and richness, available for others to build upon.
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Health Research and of Charles Darwin University, Darwin,
Australia. In the absence of a local ethics committee, written
permission to carry out the study was obtained from the
Minister for Health of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.
Results
The key barriers to establishing the National Tuberculosis
Control Program are summarised in Table 2. These included
population mobility; lack of health infrastructure, supplies,
equipment, and trained staff; transport and communication
difﬁculties; and a scarcity of ﬁnancial, technical, and political
will to address TB in the emergency phase.
Most participants expressed concern about the increased
number of TB cases during the emergency period, most likely
due to the massive displacement of people; malnutrition,
sanitation, and shelter problems; and the disruption of the
previous TB programs. WHO reported that there had been
no TB treatment program for several months in late 1999,
therefore there was a ‘‘backlog’’ of patients requiring treat-
ment [9]. The displacement of the majority of the country’s
population was another major problem in the implementa-
tion of an effective TB treatment program. It was reported
that there was a large population drift to Dili during the ﬁrst
few months of the emergency period, for security, food,
shelter, and the possibility of gaining employment [9]. This
situation greatly concerned some of the participants in this
study, who during the ﬁrst TB program coordination meeting
predicted future constraints to the successful completion of
TB treatment when these people returned to their villages
after having begun treatment in Dili.
There were also a number of factors that delayed the
process of establishing the TB program. Lack of money,
drugs, infrastructure, and transportation characterised all
sectors in East Timor in the early emergency period. It was
very difﬁcult to get from one place to another in order to
coordinate the work without regular and reliable transport
and amidst security concerns in some areas. There were many
times when TB program staff had to rely on the UN and
NGOs for transportation. In the early stage of the TB
program, the program was mainly run through the Catholic
Church clinics because many of these had not been totally
destroyed, unlike government clinics.
The main enabling factors for success of the TB program
are also summarised in Table 2. The ﬁndings of this study
suggest that at the centre of the successful development of
East Timor’s TB program were coordination, cooperation,
and collaboration between local and international agencies,
TB experts, and staff. These were brought about by a
willingness to take into account and adapt to local contextual
factors (ﬂexibility), and the strong commitment and high level
of motivation on the part of key stakeholders.
Coordination and Cooperation
By coordination, we mean a sharing of responsibilities to
prevent a duplication of effort. Cooperation is a closely
related concept, here referring to a sense of common
purpose, and the use of common methods to work together
to achieve something.
Table 2. The Major Impediments to the Establishment of a National TB Control Program in East Timor, the Solutions Identified, and the
Agencies Responsible for Their Implementation
Major Impediments Solution
Highly mobile population Suspect register
Albergues (hospices)
Rapid roll-out of program to rural areas
Communication mechanisms
Infrastructure destroyed Use of undamaged Catholic clinics
Use of alternative buildings (e.g., church halls)
Rebuilding of clinics (not in emergency phase)
Lack of coordination of/interest in TB treatment Early regular coordination meetings open to all
Appointment of lead agency
National guidelines developed
Political support ensured
MoUs developed and signed
Human resources scarce Utilisation of local capacity
High motivation and work ethic of central unit staff
Adaptation of training materials for clinicians, TB nurses, and lab staff
Rapid implementation of training courses for TB staff (open to all organisations
that had signed MoU)
Transport/communication difficulties Coordination with UN agencies
Use of vehicles and police radio
Drugs and other supplies unavailable Use of available data for planning
Rapid procurement from international sources
Limited financial resources Rapid scale-up from current donor
Extra sources of support
Increased requirement for technical support Rapid deployment and frequent repeat visits of international consultants
Continuation of long-term technical assistance
Rapid expansion of National Tuberculosis Control Program supervision to all
health units with TB program
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030383.t002
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Most participants in this study considered coordination to
be a major factor in the successful establishment of a national
TB program post-conﬂict, while acknowledging that it was
very difﬁcult to achieve given the conditions of the early
emergency phase. The competing interests of local and
international health professionals, NGO, UN agencies, and
military forces fought against it.
In the early phase of the emergency, more than 15 NGOs
plus the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
INTERFETmilitary health teamarrived to give assistance, each
of them proposing to develop activities in a particular
geographic region or in relation to a particular component
of health policy and system development [10].WHOattempted
to act as a coordinating body for health but experienced a
number of constraints. Some of those interviewed expressed
the opinion that budget limitations had preventedWHO from
functioning as effectively as had been hoped for. At that time,
services including health were highly centralised, and health
service teams were sent out from Dili to different parts of the
country in the company of the security forces. Neither capacity
building nor institutional development occurred [5,10].
Soon after the conﬂict in 1999, TB was regarded as a
relatively minor and non-urgent issue compared to diseases
with high outbreak potential such as cholera, dysentery,
dengue fever, and measles. Most of the international NGOs
chose not to include TB in their treatment procedures. As
one participant explained:
The international NGOs had their own mission, and they
focused more on acute or emergency cases. Although they
were aware of the increasing number of TB cases, they did
nothing because there was no mechanism through which
they could do so. [Senior TB program ofﬁcial]
The Caritas TB program was reported to be still function-
ing in some places at this time, and there were also some
uncoordinated, and some might say inappropriate, TB
treatments being provided by local health professionals,
who administered single-drug treatment to TB patients.
These local professionals had obtained the drugs from
government health centres before they were destroyed by
militia during the period of violence. It was difﬁcult for the
National Tuberculosis Control Program to convince these
local professionals to follow international best practice in
treating TB patients because they had been following a
different treatment regime for a long time. Some interna-
tional medical practitioners also followed sub-optimal treat-
ment regimens.
During theemergencyperiod, therewas a vacuum.Therewas
no coordination. Everybody felt they had the right to treat
TB patients without follow-up because they had no capacity
to follow up the patient. There wasn’t good coordination.
[Founding member of the Interim Health Authority]
Of those NGOs treating people for TB, not all followed the
WHO recommended treatment schedule [9]. International
NGOs and certain ‘‘independent’’ international staff main-
tained strong views on how TB patients should be treated. On
the one hand, they insisted on their own procedures for TB
control, and their ‘‘right’’ to diagnose and treat TB patients
without follow-up in many cases. On the other hand, some
refused to diagnose and treat TB, stating that it was not a
priority in a complex emergency situation, and their
organisations’ mandates precluded them from doing so.
Barriers to implement [the National Tuberculosis Control
Program] were obviously plenty, but what struck me most
was the difﬁculty in coordinating health professionals,
particularly to make them adhere to the [East Timor
National Tuberculosis Control Program] Manual or stand-
ard protocol. This is particularly so in the case of medical
doctors who came from a wide gamut of countries in the
world, bringing their own preferences and practices while
ignoring the international standards of DOTS adopted by
the TB program. [Senior Ministry of Health Ofﬁcial]
In establishing a policy framework for the provision of
general health services to the population, many interviewees
reported that, at least in the emergency period (see Table 1),
there were major difﬁculties in coordination between WHO,
the United Nations Children’s Fund, NGOs, local professio-
nals, the East Timorese Interim Health Authority, and
bilateral and multilateral donors at the highest level. Key
barriers to coordination were competition (between organ-
isations and individuals) and differences of opinion on
priorities. This included competition for resources (ﬁnancing
and local personnel), legitimacy, and leadership. For example,
some donors and some NGOs wanted to introduce their own
style of TB control without reference to the local situation.
Despite this there was intensive negotiation in an effort to
coordinate the work for the establishment of an effective TB
program. There was strong commitment to preventing the re-
establishment of parallel TB programs. Experience from the
Indonesian period demonstrated that a coordinated ap-
proach was crucial.
The experiences of TB treatment during the Indonesian
period inspired us to strengthen the coordination and
control of the treatment strategy. We [the Interim Health
Authority] appointed Caritas as the sole implementer of
the TB program in East Timor, with the authority to ban
private practitioners or NGOs from treating TB cases and
importing TB drugs without their permission. [Founding
member of the Interim Health Authority]
Caritas East Timor began holding weekly coordination
meetings to accelerate the establishment of the TB program
in late 1999. Local and international professionals, local and
international NGOs working in health, clinicians, donor
representatives, other UN agencies such as the World Food
Program and the United Nations Children’s Fund, and large
NGOs such as the International Organization for Migration,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Oxfam
were among those who routinely attended. These meetings
led to a high degree of cooperation from the organisations
involved. Senior staff made a commitment to come to these
meetings that was vitally important for the planning process.
Continuity and consistency of decision-making and the
ability to carry this back to the ﬁeld was also important. A
similar phenomenon was observed outside of Dili as the TB
program rolled out to the rural districts. The agreements on
roles and responsibilities formulated in these early coordi-
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nation meetings eventually resulted in a series of memoranda
of understanding (MoUs) between the TB program and the
implementing partners that codiﬁed the responsibilities of
the agencies involved in the implementation of the TB
program in the emergency and early transition period. These
MoUs were crucial in enforcing a standardised national
approach to TB control, particularly in the absence of any
legislative framework.
Cooperation between international TB consultants and
their Timorese colleagues as characterised by the willingness
to adapt to local circumstances was an important factor in
the establishment of a sustainable TB program in East Timor.
The international consultants involved did not see East
Timor as a ‘‘blank slate’’ upon which their public health plans
could be written without reference to local conditions. The
previous TB control structures and the experience and
expertise of local partners were acknowledged and became
central to the establishment of the TB program. From the
outset, the opinions of local TB control staff were sought
before any decisions were made on technical and operational
aspects. At their second meeting, the coordinating committee
of the TB program appointed a Timorese doctor (NM) as the
national TB coordinator, who chaired all subsequent meet-
ings and became the founding TB program director.
We had the money and expertise; we could easily have built
a sophisticated, though unsustainable TB program in East
Timor. However, we did not do it because we did not want
to be involved in the same mistakes as has occurred in
Kosovo and Cambodia. [international TB consultant]
In East Timor, money and drugs became readily available
because of the prompt response to the crisis by donors,
including the long-term donor to the NGO program. This
continuity of ﬁnancial and technical support, together with
additional support from other sources in the emergency
period, was identiﬁed as one of the most important factors in
accelerating the process of developing the TB program.
Collaboration
Collaboration is a concept that is deeper than cooperation
and represents a shared vision for the future and not merely
the absence of competition. Partnership, shared understand-
ing, open communication, tolerance of difference, and trust
are key components of a collaborative approach. In the case
of the National Tuberculosis Control Program in East Timor,
successful implementation depended on the readiness of
local staff to trust their international counterparts, to learn
from them, and to adopt the international best practice
standard. At the time, many East Timorese were experiencing
intense feelings of distrust following the deeply disturbing
and destructive events of September 1999. The withdrawal of
the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) at the
time of the violence despite earlier commitments to protect
voters after the referendum, regardless of the result, reﬂected
badly on international staff. Many members of the UN
mission were surprised to experience rejection from their
East Timorese colleagues. The lack of trust needed to be
managed sensitively and sincerely. Sergio Lobo—the Interim
Health Authority Co-Chair at the time—coined the phrase
‘‘one table, two chairs’’ to encapsulate the expectation that
local and international counterparts would sit and work
together, to develop ideas and make decisions. This was
central throughout the process of developing the TB
program.
Well, I think it is because there was a willingness to work
together between local and international expertise. But it
depends on the international expert or counterpart to
transfer the knowledge and provide a motivation [to the
local staff]. On the other hand, the willingness of local
professionals to accept the opportunity to learn and to
work based on the international best practice standard [is
also important]. [senior TB program ofﬁcial]
Throughout, there was also strong commitment from TB
program consultants and staff to incorporate international
best practice guidelines at the local level. This was covered in a
MoU signed by the main stakeholders in early 2000 (Table 3).
One strength of the collaboration at that time was the
ability of international experts to recognise the importance of
the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT) as
the only representative political organisation in East Timor.
At my ﬁrst attendance as CNRT representative to the health
coordination meeting organised by WHO and UNICEF
[UnitedNationsChildren’s Fund], I realized that themeeting
was to coordinate the work of the international NGOs and
agencies. Later on, I was told that the UN and most of [the]
international agencies have a mandate or regulation that
prevents them to work with any political party. CNRT has
been regarded as a political party. [CNRThealth spokesman]
There were strong links between the CNRT and Caritas
East Timor during the Indonesian period. This internal
political proﬁle, Caritas East Timor’s track record in TB
control, and the recommendations of the October 1999 WHO
assessment mission prompted the Interim Health Authority
to appoint Caritas East Timor as the lead agency in the new
National Tuberculosis Control Program [11]. This decision
was crucial to establishing a sustainable TB program.
The government [Interim Health Authority] made a
decision to have only one TB program and appointed
Caritas East Timor as the implementing agency. That
decision was based on: ﬁrstly, because [of] the fact that the
Catholic clinics structure was there; secondly, Caritas East
Timor has experienced staff who were willing to run and
manage the program; and lastly, the government didn’t yet
have the structure to manage and run the program.
[founding member of the Interim Health Authority]
East Timorese sovereignty over the TB program was
maintained throughout the establishment and expansion of
the TB program. This ensured a rapid response by the TB
program leadership, with the assistance of international
consultants, to feedback from the ﬁeld, and to the analysis
of quantitative data available from the program.
Most of the participants in this study felt that staff
motivation was also a key factor in the success of the TB
program. This was a difﬁcult time for the staff in the early
stage, with most directly or indirectly affected by the post-
referendum violence. Despite this, most TB control staff
remained highly motivated and committed. The Christian
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ethos of the NGO staff was an important factor, and staff drew
strength from their Christian beliefs to serve those in need.
The strong Timorese leadership was also an important
motivating factor. There was the previous experience from
the NGO TB program pre-independence, there was also a
certain amount of euphoria about ﬁnally becoming inde-
pendent, which led to many extraordinary things. Nation
building, contributing from one’s own expertise, coming
together to assist fellow Timorese, these were all elements that
bolstered health workers working for no pay, or only minimal
pay, during the emergency and even well into the post-
emergency phase.
In January 2000, less than 2 mo after the ﬁrst coordination
meeting, National Tuberculosis Control Program was
launched. This occurred 1 mo prior to the establishment of
the Interim Health Authority. Five months after the ﬁrst
meeting, one co-chair of the Interim Health Authority
referred to the TB program as the ‘‘shining light’’ in the
reconstruction process of East Timor, a view supported by
many interviewees.
It [the TB program] was the ﬁrst program to develop a
memorandum of understanding....In that sense it was a
model of collaboration in which all of the partners had
clearly deﬁned roles. The links with the church-run health
services [were] a great asset in re-establishing the program
as well as the continuous commitment of Caritas Norway.
The proximity of the technical assistance in Darwin was
obviously helpful. [founding member of the Interim Health
Authority]
Four Years On: Current Challenges for the TB Program in
East Timor
TB control remains a public health priority for the new
East Timorese administration. Participants in this study are
aware of many problems that might affect the program’s
future effectiveness and sustainability.
Indeed, the TB program [is] probably facing the same
constraints that TB programs everywhere in less developed
countries are facing: personnel issues, supervision, quality
control, etc. [founding member of the Interim Health
Authority]
The lack of a sense of ownership of the program by
government health staff has been noted since the TB program
launch. Some staff of government clinics still regard the TB
program as a non-government program and refuse to commit
their time. The perception that the TB program is the
responsibility of Caritas has begun to change since the
Minister of Health wrote a letter to staff directing them to
cooperate with the TB program as part of the core business of
the Government Health Service. However, this cooperation
needs further consolidation through the involvement of sub-
districts and health posts in all TB program activities [7].
There has been a feeling of job insecurity and dissat-
isfaction among TB program staff due to the fact that many
are on short-term contracts with NGOs. In some cases, those
with previous experience in TB have been appointed to non-
TB-program positions in the government health service,
Table 3. Main Roles of Collaborating Partners in the Establishment and Implementation of the TB Program in East Timor, as Laid out in
MoU in 2000
Partner Main Roles
NGO (lead agency) Implement TB control
Choose and employ the NTP director and central unit staff
Be responsible for supply and distribution of drugs and other supplies and for
writing TB manual and other materials
Report (at least quarterly) on the progress of the NTP to the Interim Health
Authority
Ensure regular supervision of all regions and districts
Take a leading role in the planning and conduct of training courses
Interim Health Authority (nascent Ministry of Health) Ensure that the activities of the NTP are in accordance with East Timor’s national
health policies and plans
Facilitate and ensure the full participation of suitable and interested health ser-
vice providers
Oversee the coordination of the parties involved with the NTP
External donors Be the main donor for the NTP
Periodically monitor the progress of the NTP
External technical advisors Provide external technical assistance to lead agency in the planning and imple-
mentation of the NTP
Participate in capability building of East Timorese health workers through formal
and on-the-job training
Participate in the periodical monitoring of the NTP progress
Participate in planned reviews and evaluations of the NTP
WHO Participate in planned reviews and evaluations of the NTP
Assist the NTP with the planning and conduct of training courses and with hu-
man resource development
In 1999–2001, actual implementation of the National Tuberculosis Control Program at district, sub-district, and clinic level relied heavily on cooperation with many other partners in
government and non-government health-care providers. This was a dynamic situation, with increasing Interim Health Authority responsibility as the recruitment of government staff was
finalised (see Figure 1).
NTP, National Tuberculosis Control Program.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030383.t003
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leaving their positions in the TB program vacant. Con-
sequently, the government has had to recruit staff that have
no previous TB program experience for key roles within the
TB program. This has necessitated retraining in many cases.
The government has been recruiting the experienced staff
to work in the TB program; however, because of their
competency they are often promoted to higher level
positions, leaving their [empty] posts to be ﬁlled by those
who lack TB experience. [senior Ministry of Health ofﬁcial]
Some participants felt there is a need to change the
government recruitment procedure so as to keep the current
TB program structure under Caritas. Given continuing
capacity gaps in the government health service, they felt that
Caritas is the best organisation to continue to manage the TB
program. However, there is a recognised need for the
government to take over some coordination and ﬁnancial
responsibility so as to gain a greater sense of ownership of the
program. Navigating this challenging period of handover
from NGO to government sensitively and constructively is
key to the long-term sustainability of most, if not all,
emergency-introduced health programs.
There was also concern expressed about the low level of
community awareness of TB in East Timor, and some argued
that unless this issue is addressed TB will always be a problem.
Some informants suggested that this problem could be
overcome by conducting a promotional campaign on TB to
increase patient and community awareness. It is a challenge
not only to explain what the TB program strategy involves
but also to help patients understand the rationale behind the
strategy. As one participant argued:
There is a need to allocate more time and resources to
conduct [a] nation-wide health education campaign in the
country. This will reduce stigma and improve the patients’
knowledge on TB. [international TB consultant]
Major challenges remain in determining the appropriate
balance between different components of TB programs and
in recognising the limitations of each component in achiev-
ing long-term sustainable health outcomes.
Discussion
There have been consistent calls for a more reﬂective
approach to the evaluation of health-care interventions in
conﬂict-affected settings—leading to policies and guidelines
better informed by evidence—if we are to improve the
international response [12–15]. Several recent high-proﬁle
complex emergencies—in Mozambique, Cambodia, Kosovo,
East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq—demonstrate that post-
conﬂict situations, and the response to them, as well as the
response required, have changed in a number of important
ways. TB control in these settings is particularly interesting
and illustrative.
The geographic distribution of TB and that of political
conﬂict overlap. Of the top 22 countries with high TB
burden, which account for 80% of all cases of TB in the
world, seven have a history of signiﬁcant conﬂict and/or
complex emergency situations in recent years [2]. During the
1980s and 1990s, high rates of TB disease and TB mortality
were reported in refugee camps in Africa and Asia [16–20].
Social and political disruption fuel TB epidemics and disrupt
the delivery of TB control services, resulting in increased
numbers of cases and, because of incomplete treatment,
heighten the possibility of multiple-drug-resistant TB [21,22].
This global epidemiology reinforces the need to improve
TB control in these complex settings, both for the beneﬁt of
the people affected by the conﬂict and for neighbouring
nations, including those that receive refugees for temporary
or permanent re-settlement. This was dramatically demon-
strated by the high rate of TB documented in participants of
the ‘‘safe haven’’ exercise in East Timor in 1999 [6]. East
Timorese arriving in Darwin during September 1999 repre-
sented less than 0.01% of the Australian population, but
accounted for 6% of all TB cases diagnosed in Australia in
that year [23].
Continuity of health systems in periods of transition from
pre-emergency to during emergency to post-emergency and
ultimately to sustainable programs is an important compo-
nent of international responses to emergencies, but is rarely
achieved. Coordination, cooperation, and collaboration were
key components to achieving this aim in relation to TB
control in East Timor.
Coordination
Poor coordination is a well established problem in the
response to complex emergencies [13,21,24]. As was the case
in Kosovo, WHO’s ambition to become the implementing
agency for certain programs meant that it was at risk of being
seen as a competitor with other implementing agencies [13].
Constrained organisational mandates have been described
elsewhere as a potential impediment to comprehensive care
and services [25]. It can be argued that this is a reasonable and
perhaps responsible attitude for agencies with short-term
commitments and a lack of expertise in TB. However, in the
context of East Timor in 1999, many of the usual public
health and clinical concerns of emergency situations were not
present, whilst TB was so prominent [6,26]. It was thus
appropriate that the health sector did treat TB as a priority
issue in the early emergency phase.
Caritas East Timor was appointed as the lead agency of the
National Tuberculosis Control Program and successfully
acted as the coordinating body. The role of faith-based
NGOs is increasingly recognised as important—but not
without complexity and contradictions—in international
development settings [27]. One of the negative aspects of
having leadership be in the hands of an NGO is the NGO’s
lack of legislative authority. Hence, cooperation with the
government is crucial. For example, in East Timor, the TB
program required the Interim Health Authority to take a
policy decision to stop the private sector from importing TB
drugs or treating TB independent of the TB control program.
Cooperation
The emergency period is critical. The rapid injection of
money, expertise, and technology makes the recipient coun-
tries vulnerable to the development of sophisticated programs
that they will not be able to sustain. It takes good planning with
extensive knowledge of the local situation to establish a cost-
effective and sustainable program for a country under these
circumstances, and cooperation, particularly with local coun-
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terparts, is a key component for facilitating this desirable
outcome. The inclusive approach taken during the establish-
ment of the TB program in East Timor was in contrast to some
other programs introduced in the emergency period by
speciﬁc donors and/or international NGOs. The Roll Back
Malaria campaign [28] and an oral health program [5] lacked
the same level of cooperation with local partners, and these
programs have been less successfully sustained in the longer
term. In Cambodia the UN took control of the TB Control
Program in 1989 and sidelined local expertise for political
reasons, allowing state-based structures and services to be
unwound [29]. The result was limited short-term success, but
an unsustainable program in the long term [29].
Collaboration
The truly collaborative approach used in the establishment
of the TB control program in East Timor was built on mutual
trust and ﬂexibility. Key to the development of these was a
recognition of the political context of East Timor by
international TB advisors.
In contrast with other political emergencies, for example,
in Kosovo and Cambodia, where competing political interests
were prominent and contestation the norm, [13] the CNRT
was the single, uncontested political authority in post-conﬂict
East Timor. While the CNRT was the umbrella organisation
for all political parties and groups that fought for independ-
ence, in the early phase of the emergency period most of the
NGOs and UN agencies refused to work with them as they
were bound by their mandate not to deal with political
parties. This created a sense of exclusion among the
Timorese. WHO was the exception, and considered the
CNRT a valuable partner in health system development [26].
International technical advisors truly listened to local
experience and accepted that this experience was valid in
the local context of East Timor. Local solutions, not just the
uncritical adoption of international standard solutions, were
key components of the success of the TB program [30]. This
ﬂexible approach was more about the maintenance of
Timorese sovereignty and the recognition of the local
political context than about radical changes to internation-
ally recognised best practice guidelines. All of the essential
elements of DOTS were maintained, with the adoption of
some local adaptations (e.g., use of hospices in the intensive
phase of treatment, a network of satellite clinics in churches
and other public buildings, and the use of incentives to
ensure treatment compliance) [7]. Trust is increasingly being
described as a key issue in the re-establishment of services in
the aftermath of conﬂict [31]. For Timorese health workers,
the mixture of feelings of euphoria, pride, and distrust might
have prevented them from accepting and cooperating with
the international staff in the initial post-conﬂict period.
Importantly, local TB health workers trusted their interna-
tional advisors and heeded their advice concerning, for
example, the need for an inclusive approach and the use of
MoUs. Thus, ﬂexibility, built on trust, was a crucial two-way
process in the TB control program establishment.
Conclusion
During 2000, a sustainable national TB control program
was established in East Timor in a post-conﬂict setting,
despite the many difﬁculties encountered. Coordination,
cooperation, and collaboration were the keys to this success,
achieved through the high level of commitment of those
involved, and the willingness of international experts and
agencies to acknowledge local expertise and adapt to local
circumstances. The latter was most evident in the early
appointment of a local NGO to manage and implement the
program. The utilisation of an existing local structure
drawing on local expertise and experienced staff was essential
to the program’s success. The East Timorese TB program
continues to function well and to improve the breadth and
quality of its interventions. The government’s commitment
to, and sense of ownership of, the national TB program will be
important to its continued performance improvement, and to
ensuring its long-term sustainability. It is acknowledged that
certain contextual issues, including the relatively small size of
the country, the presence of charismatic Timorese leadership,
and the presence of ongoing external ﬁnancial and technical
support, have also contributed to the establishment of the TB
program. The East Timorese experience holds useful lessons
for international donors and aid agencies and for those
establishing TB control programs in other complex emer-
gency situations in the future.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Tuberculosis is an infectious disease and one of the world’s
most serious health problems. It causes between 2 million and 3 million
deaths every year, most of them in developing countries. The success of
national control programs has varied considerably between countries. In
times of war or other emergencies, control efforts are considerably
hampered. East Timor is a former Portuguese colony in Southeast Asia
annexed by Indonesia in 1975. It is a small country of about 1 million
people situated some 500 miles northwest of Australia. In 1999,
following a referendum on independence from Indonesia, violent civil
conflict led to the destruction of much of East Timor’s health-care
system. As tuberculosis was known to be one of the country’s biggest
health problems, efforts to improve treatment were launched during the
transition to independence in 2002. Several organizations, led by a local
non-government organization (NGO), Caritas East Timor, collaborated in
the new program. Many difficulties had to be overcome, including the
forced movement of people away from their homes during the fighting,
the departure of many health-care workers from the country, and the
destruction of health-care facilities. Nevertheless, in its first three years
the program diagnosed and commenced treatment on 10,722 patients.
The rate of treatment success reached 81% in 2003, which—in
international terms—is regarded as very high.
Why Was This Study Done? The researchers wanted to find out from
the people involved with the program how well they thought it was
performing, what its strengths were, and what remained to be achieved.
The lessons learned could be of use in other countries, particularly those
recovering from civil conflict and other emergencies.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? In 2003, the researchers
reviewed all available documents that had been written about the
tuberculosis program. They also carried out interviews with 24 senior
people involved with the program. Some of them were East Timorese,
and some were from international organizations. The questions asked in
the interviews were semi-structured. In other words, the researchers
wanted to make sure that certain topics were covered but also wanted
the people they questioned to have freedom in the way they gave their
answers; they were not restricted to answering only ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no.’’ This
kind of approach, where there is no gathering of precise figures that can
be mathematically analyzed, is known as qualitative research.
The national tuberculosis program was considered to be working well in
2003. The researchers concluded that good coordination, cooperation,
and collaboration were the most important factors contributing to the
successes that had been achieved. The existing local structure and
experience of the local NGO, the commitment among local personnel
and international advisors to establishing an effective program, and the
willingness of international advisers and local counterparts to be flexible
in their approach were also important factors. The feeling among some
government health workers that they lacked ‘‘ownership’’ of the
program was one problem that still needed to be overcome.
What Do These Findings Mean? Even after a major conflict, it was
possible to launch an effective tuberculosis program in East Timor. Other
countries in similar situations might be able to achieve success by
applying the same approach. Unfortunately, renewed conflict broke out
in East Timor in 2006. It will again be necessary to restore services,
putting to use the lessons already learned.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030383.
 Basic information about tuberculosis can be found on the Web site of
the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
 The Web site of the World Health Organization’s Stop TB department
describes the recommended strategies for tuberculosis control
 TB Alert, a UK-based charity that promotes tuberculosis awareness
worldwide, has information on tuberculosis in several European,
African, and Asian languages
 A country profile of East Timor is available on the BBC Web site
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org October 2006 | Volume 3 | Issue 10 | e3831775
TB in Post-Conflict East Timor
